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ABSTRACT 
This paper deals with J.L. Austin’s conception of illocution and some of its philosophical implications as 
to value judgments and social ontology. It is argued that according to Austin, illocutionary acts have 
conventional effects, and that conventional effects are defeasible and depend upon intersubjective 
agreement. In support of the claim that all illocutionary acts have conventional effects, it is explained 
how illocutionary effects can be described and this mode of description is applied to Austin’s classes of 
illocutionary acts. Then, the implications of Austin’s classification of illocutionary acts for value 
judgments are discussed and it is claimed that Austin challenges the fact-value dichotomy by 
assimilating statements of fact to value judgments. The Austinian conception of illocution is also 
relevant to social ontology. Many social realities can be described as sets of deontic states of the agents 
involved, and illocution is part of the picture because it involves the active production of deontic states 
of social agents by means of intersubjective agreement. In conclusion, a possible counterintuitive 
consequence of the conception of illocution presented is discussed and a solution is proposed.  
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1. Introduction 
 
In this paper I present the Austinian notion of illocutionary effect and discuss 
some of its philosophical implications as to value judgments and social ontology. 
Illocutionary acts are characterized by most authors as acts, whose effect is the 
production of the hearer’s uptake. They aim to be understood or, more 
specifically, to make the hearer understand the speaker’s communicative 
intention. This idea is to be found in early work on speech act theory by Strawson 
(1964) and Searle (1965, 1969). It seems both historically fair and theoretically 
relevant to mention that it was not Austin’s idea. Indeed, reconstructing Austin’s 
perspective on illocution can help us see that speech act theory was originarily 
designed to have philosophical implications that have failed to be made explicit 
ever since. 
In the next section I explain how the notion of illocutionary act as the 
expression of a communicative intention aiming at its own recognition became 
part of the mainstream version of speech act theory. I then explain what I believe 
Austin meant to say about illocution with his famous remark about the role of the 
hearer’s uptake, and what the resulting notion of a conventional illocutionary 
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effect contributes to certain issues in discourse analysis and in philosophy, 
particularly those about value judgments and social ontology. 
  
 
2. Austinian illocutionary effects 
 
In introducing three ways in which illocutionary acts are, according to him, 
connected to effects, Austin writes: 
“Unless a certain effect is achieved, the illocutionary act will not have been 
happily, successfully performed […]. I cannot be said to have warned an audience 
unless it hears what I say and takes what I say in a certain sense[…] the 
performance of an illocutionary act involves the securing of uptake.” (1962, 116) 
Peter F. Strawson, in his paper on “Intention and convention in speech acts” 
(1964), reads Austin as implying that no other effect than uptake is necessarily 
connected to the performance of an illocutionary act. This reading enables him to 
reinterpret Austin’s illocutionary force as a kind of speaker meaning (in the sense 
given to this expression by Grice 1957), that is, the intention of the speaker to 
achieve a response thanks to the recognition by the audience of her intention to 
achieve it. Searle shares Strawson’s view, but adds to it that the response aimed at 
should not be thought of as the actual formation of a new belief or other attitude 
in the audience, which would be a perlocutionary effect as opposed to an 
illocutionary one, and that the conventionality of language should be recognized 
as contributing to the understanding of the speaker’s intention on the part of the 
audience. He then defines the “illocutionary effect” as the understanding of the 
meaning and force of an utterance (1969, 47). Strawson’s reading of Austin’s 
notion of uptake later influenced the inferential approach to speech act theory of 
Kent Bach and R.M. Harnish (Bach and Harnish 1979), and continues to be 
influential.  
However, as I have already argued elsewhere (Sbisà 2009), Austin merely 
meant uptake to be a necessary condition for the successful achievement of the 
core effect of the illocutionary act, and just after the passage we have cited, he 
describes thus the second effect to which he holds the illocutionary act to be 
connected: 
 “The illocutionary act ‘takes effect’ in certain ways, as distinguished from 
producing consequences in the sense of bringing about states of affairs in the 
‘normal’ way, i.e. changes in the natural course of events…”. (Austin 1962, 117)  
It is clear enough that he means this effect to be produced by all kinds of 
illocutionary acts (while the third effect he mentions, the inviting of a response, is 
explicitly attributed to some kinds only). The problem with the illocutionary act’s 
“taking effect” is that Austin’s characterization of it is vague and more negative 
than positive (saying what it is not rather than what it is), and exemplified by one 
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case only, the formal and ceremonial act of naming a ship, from which it appears 
difficult to generalize.  
I think that the key to understanding what this mysterious effect consists of, 
lies in considering what way of bringing about a state of affairs is to be contrasted 
with the “normal” way, that is, with the introduction of a change in the natural 
course of events.  When we do something that interacts with a natural chain of 
causes and effects, our contribution and its effects come to belong to that chain, 
on a par with its other members: the efficacy of what we do is by natural 
causation. But in the case of the naming of a ship, the illocutionary effect is that 
the ship is given a name, so that certain subsequent acts (such as referring to the 
ship by another name) are out of order. Such an effect is not tho e output of a 
natural causal chain, nor of a change we introduce into such a chain. It occurs in a 
social frame and needs the audience recognize that a naming procedure was 
successfully performed. 
Austin may have been wrong to rely on this example alone, as if it were 
intuitive that we can generalize from it. But that Austin maintained that 
illocutionary acts have conventional effects, is already shown by his Condition A1 
for the felicity of performative utterances (I recall that illocutionary acts are the 
kind of actions that performative utterances perform):  
“There must exist an accepted conventional procedure having a certain 
conventional effect, that procedure to include the uttering of certain words by 
certain persons in certain circumstances…”. (Austin 1962, 14, my italics) 
Thus, according to Austin, the core effect of an illocutionary act is 
“conventional”; that is, it is made possible by the social frame and brought about 
thanks to that kind of agreement between speaker and audience about what is 
being done, which we may call uptake. The conventionality that according to him 
is common to all illocutionary acts appears, then, to pertain primarily to effects. 
It should be noted that in the debate over the conventionality of illocutionary 
acts, attention has been paid mainly to the means by which the illocutionary act 
is performed, while the nature of its effects has been neglected. This has led to 
recognizing as conventional acts only those illocutionary acts whose performance 
is explicitly and rigidly regulated by extralinguistic conventions, while other 
illocutionary acts have been analyzed, following Strawson’s suggestion, as 
intention-based. But if all illocutionary acts are conventional for Austin, it must 
be is because they all have conventional effects. It is this sense of “being a 
conventional act” that has to be taken into account in order for us to grasp what 
Austin wanted to contend, or if we think there is something to be learnt from his 
conception of illocution.1 
                                                            
1 Ruth Millikan, who defends the conventionality of illocutionary acts, does so on the basis of 
her conception of  conventionality as the repetition of patterns (Millikan 1998, 2005; see also 
Kissine 2013, 179-181). Although she focuses, as usual, upon the means by which the act is 
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Of course, what makes an effect conventional is still an open question, which I 
will have something to say about in section 3. I will then move on (in section 4) to 
another matter not treated in sufficient detail by Austin: the problem of how to 
describe the conventional effects of illocutionary acts. 
 
 
3. When is an effect “conventional”?  
 
In his preparatory notes for How to Do Things with Words,  Austin seems to be 
worrying about a possible contradiction between his doctrine of infelicities (the 
flaws in performative utterances that can make them “null and void”) and the 
received principle that nothing that was done can be made undone (the source of 
which is in Aristotle’s Nichomachean Ethics, 6,2) (cf. Sbisà 2007). He realizes that, 
when an utterance designed to perform a certain illocutionary act turns out to be 
“null and void”, the act that it purported to perform does not hold and its alleged 
effects vanish. In a way, it seems that something which was done is indeed 
rendered undone. In fact, by-default agreement about some act and its effects 
gives provisional reality and efficacy to states of affairs (e.g. a couple’s being man 
and wife) that later on may be discovered not to hold (e.g. if it turns out that one 
of the spouses was already married). This provisional, by-default reality is 
puzzling, but seems to be typical of “conventional” effects. It corresponds 
approximately to the property of “defeasibility” pertaining, according to Hart 
(1949), to the ascriptions of rights and of responsibility: the liability to being 
annulled in particular circumstances.  When an illocutionary act is “null and 
void”, not everything in it is rendered undone: something was done in any case, 
and namely, the (flawed) performance of a procedure, and there are effects, 
though these might be different from those which that procedure is designed to 
bring about (e.g. legal responsibility for bigamy).  The discovery of infelicity 
makes the illocutionary act undone insofar as the bringing about of its 
conventional effect is concerned. In this sense, defeasibility can be seen as the 
hallmark of conventionality for actions and their effects.  
Obviously, if the effect brought about by a certain action is to be defeasible, it 
must be produced in a way which admits of annullation. This way cannot 
therefore consist in the causal modification of a material object. Austin’s claim 
that illocutionary acts “take effect” in a way other than by interacting with a 
natural chain of causes and effects, together with his claim that they cannot be 
successfully performed (and therefore “take effect”)  unless the audience’s uptake 
is secured (see section 2 above), suggest that the way in which conventional effects 
                                                                                                                                                                                                     
performed, the resulting view of illocution may be compatible with the Austinian view I favour 
(for a view based on Millikan’s, which seems to accept some of my points about the nature and 
dynamics of illocution, see Witek 2014). 
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can be brought about is precisely through by-default agreement among the 
relevant participants as to their being brought about.  
The “uptake” to be secured by illocutionary acts is, therefore, an agreement of 
the participants (often implicit or even tacit) upon what has been done. When this 
agreement occurs (or can be presumed to occur by default, in the absence of any 
sign of disagreement), the illocutionary act has been successfully performed and 
its conventional effect has been achieved (in the defeasible mode explained above). 
There are a whole series of further problems as regards the securing of uptake: 
notably, whether the actual bringing about of uptake is required, or whether the 
mere effort of doing all that would reasonably lead to actual uptake, and whether 
it is the actual uptake or intended uptake that determines the illocutionary act 
performed. I cannot address these problems here, but I would suggest that there 
are many shades to them. For example, a patently wrong uptake will usually not 
be intersubjectively shared,  and will therefore remain ineffective, while a 
plausible, not contested actual uptake can reasonably be recognized as selecting 
the illocutionary act that is actually performed with an utterance displaying 
vague or ambigous illocutionary force indicators.  
 
 
4. How to describe illocutionary effects 
 
The claim that all illocutionary acts have conventional effects brings to the fore 
the problem of how to describe illocutionary effects. Quite obviously, and apart 
from any theoretical motivation and argument, this claim will be plausible only if, 
for any illocutionary act, one can describe an effect belonging to the conventional 
kind. In my discussions of this topic, I have proposed that illocutionary effects be 
described in terms of the distribution of deontic roles among the relevant 
participants in the situation (1984; 2006, 164-167). 
Interpersonal relations can be described in psychological terms, both cognitive 
and emotional, but they also have a deontic dimension, relative to what members 
are allowed or authorized or obliged or committed to do with respect to each other 
or possibly to third parties too. My proposal is that the illocutionary effect is a 
change in these aspects of the interpersonal relation, which I call “deontic” 
inasmuch as they are connected with what one can or cannot or should or should 
not do (one might also call them “normative”, see Witek 2014).2 The illocutionary 
effect is bi-lateral, since a change in the deontic role of one participant requires a 
corresponding change in the deontic role of some other one.  
                                                            
2 John Searle too recognized and discussed the deontic dimension of social facts in his The 
Construction of Social Reality, from a perspective based on his notion of declaration and on 
“count as” rules (1995, 100-110). He concluded, however, that reference to deontic aspects was 
not particularly useful for his project.  
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The variety of illocutionary effects, so intended, can be described on an 
empirical and linguistic-phenomenological basis, without any pre-conceived 
symmetry or constraint. The resulting typology is certainly weaker than a 
theoretical, principled one, but is perfectly suited to the aims of exemplifying 
conventional effects and of providing discourse analysis with empirically 
grounded heuristic tools. In such descriptions, we can use the lexicon of modal 
verbs (can, should, ought to), other deontic verbs (e.g. oblige, commit, entitle) and 
nouns (e.g. obligation, commitment, entitlement, duty, debt, right, license). Not 
all states that can be described in such terms are the direct effect of an 
illocutionary act; some may be the effect of non-verbal procedures approximately 
equivalent to an illocutionary act of a certain kind, others may be deontic-level 
consequences stemming from illocutionary effects. Here are examples of 
conventional effects of illocutionary acts, described in terms of the deontic states 
produced: 
• Marrying: bilateral rights + obligations 
• Naming : semantic rule + social norm (holding for all 
participants) 
• Promising: commitment (for speaker) vs right (for addressee) 
• Apologizing: exemption (for speaker) vs empowerment (for 
addressee) 
• Advising: bilateral non-strict obligations 
• Warning: obligation (for addressee) vs exemption (for speaker)  
The typical effects of Austin’s illocutionary classes can also be described in 
these terms, approximately as follows:  
• Verdictives: license to act upon the judgement (for addressee) vs 
committment to truth or correctness (for speaker) 
• Commissives: right to expect a certain kind of behaviour from the 
speaker (for addressee) – commitment to perform (for speaker) 
• Exercitives: obligation + (possibly) rights and powers (for addressee) 
vs commitment to support the addressee’s deontic state (for speaker) 
• Behabitives: license to act upon the speaker’s expressed state (for the 
addressee) vs satisfaction of a task or debt (for the speaker) 
• Expositives: rights, obligations, etc. as above, affecting relations 
internal or relevant to discourse or conversation. 
Note that by focusing on conventional effects, we find ways of describing 
illocution other than the lexicon of performative verbs and thus provide the 
analyst with subtler tools for all those illocutionary acts, the force of which is the 
result of the combination of a number of indicators and is therefore complex or 
hybrid. It goes without saying that this way to describe illocution is not bound to 
assume one-to-one correspondence between sentence type and (intended) 
illocutionary act. 
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Though not relevant to the topic of this paper, it should be stressed that the 
way of describing illocutionary effects presented here also preserves the illocution-
perlocution distinction, which is sometimes under threat from those approaches 
that treat all effects of speech acts (other than uptake) as perlocutionary ones and 
therefore external to the illocutionary act. Distinguishing illocution from 
perlocution is not a matter of contrasting an act with its effects or consequences, 
but regards instead the kind of effects (material or psychological on the one hand, 
conventional on the other) that are taken into consideration. Once this is clarified, 
using the illocutionary-perlocutionary distinction in the analysis of discourse and 
conversation may become easier and more fruitful. Indeed, it should be possible to 
recognize the mediating role of illocutionary effects between speech and its 
psychological and behavioral effects.  
 
 
5. Philosophical implications for the value-fact distinction  
 
If, as I have tried to explain, the production of conventional effects is ultimately 
grounded in local tacit agreement, various consequences follow as to the 
foundations of the human social world. Illocution appears as the locus of the 
“social contract”. The very agreement that something has been done by words, 
that after certain words are uttered the relation between the interlocutors changes 
in some way, is an instance of “social contract” which might (in principle) be 
conceived of as radically bottom-up (while of course it is most often the renewal of 
a previously established social frame). Thus illocution (with language, which 
makes it possible) enables us to regulate our living together, building up shared 
environments and (hopefully) reducing the need to resort to brute force and 
coercion in order to solve problems of coordination.  
The conception of illocution as presented here has also implications for the 
philosophy of action, since it comprises the non-trivial assumption that 
performing an action is equivalent to making oneself responsible for its effect (a 
certain state of affairs in the world); for the conception of value and the value-fact 
distinction, which is in question whenever the assertive or descriptive use of 
language is distinguished from or compared to the use of language in assessments, 
value judgments and other value-laden speech acts; and for social ontology, since 
it appears to introduce new kinds of entities into our social world.  I will now 
touch briefly on some of the implications concerning the value-fact distinction and 
social ontology. 
How is moral judgment to be described in this Austinian framework? In his 
conclusion to How to Do Things with Words, Austin suggests that “good” is to  be 
considered as at least in part an illocutionary force indicator (1962, 163-164). This 
reminds us of the theories of ethical language put forward by C.L. Stevenson or 
R.M. Hare, in which “good” is said to express approval or prescribe conduct.  But 
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is illocutionary force the same as Hare’s “neustic”, or is Austin’s view of moral 
language a sophisticated variety of emotivism? There are hints at different ideas 
in Austin’s conclusive chapter. 
He says that his classification of illocutionary acts, albeit tentative, is enough 
to “play old Harry” with the “fetish” of the value-fact dichotomy (1962, 151). 
But how could the mere shift of the problem of the analysis of “good” from 
locutionary meaning to illocutionary force have this effect? If facts are still 
represented in the “locutionary content”, while values are the effect of choices and 
preferences and therefore belong with illocutionary force, is the fact-value 
dichotomy questioned at all? 
In principle, the fact-value dichotomy can be questioned in two ways: by 
assimilating values to facts and facts to values. One of these ways is naive realism 
about values. Those who embrace it are admirable, because they display 
unshakable faith in the reality of the Good. But their position is liable to be 
borrowed and exploited by fundamentalism, since, with naive realism about 
values, there comes the assumption that one can know them with at least the 
same degree of certainty with which we know facts. The other way stresses the 
human and actional component in factual judgment. We are keen to recognize 
that value judgments are actions: they involve choice. They are not so arbitrary 
or subjective as emotional reactions, since they involve the application of criteria, 
but still there is choice in them, at two levels at least: as to the criteria to be 
adopted, and as to the appreciation of the relevant details of the situation which is 
subject to evaluation. But are factual judgments so different? Don’t we use 
criteria in them too (for example, when the judgment results from an inference)? 
Moreover, factual assertions, too, depend as to their content on our appreciation 
of the relevant details of the event or situation which is reported or described.  
Austin’s way of questioning the fact-value dichotomy is the latter. It is not so 
much expressed by his attempt to present matters of value as matters of force (as 
opposed to meaning), as by the way in which he speaks of value in his 
classification of illocutionary acts. There, he groups all judgments together in the 
class of verdictives, which are “the delivering of a finding, official or unofficial, 
upon evidence or reasons as to value or fact” (153), need not be final (152), and are 
concerned with something “which is for different reasons hard to be certain 
about” (152). The last feature is perhaps the most interesting one. Why should 
acts of judgment address only matters which are for some reason hard to be 
certain about? Insofar as our knowledge of events and situations in the world is 
based on our judgments (that is, on verdictive illocutionary acts), Austin depicts 
it as something not effortless, but involving actual search for evidence, adoption 
of criteria, or reasoning, which are kinds of active behaviour on the part of the 
speaker, with some degree of choice as to what is to count as evidence, which 
criterion is correct, or what reasons are good ones. Different agents might reach 
different findings: we might then compare those findings and prefer the soundest 
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and best grounded one, or, at least, the one which appears as such to us. But the 
same picture, with slight re-contextualization and small adjustments, may be 
taken to hold for value judgments. 
It is not clear how Austin intended to deal with those statements of fact that 
are not about something difficult, unclear and the like. What he clearly wants to 
stress, though, is that whenever we issue a judgment we are engaging in a complex 
activity. Nonverbal perception may be “direct” and be both phenomenologically 
understood and verbally reported as the perception of the real object. But 
judgment, albeit a source of knowledge, is not a passive reflection of reality. For 
Austin, our knowledge is no mirror of anything: unlike mirrors, it involves an 
active stance. It is brought about by action, precisely by verdictive illocutionary 
acts. 
If verdictives, so characterized, may also be concerned with values, should we 
conclude that value judgments too produce knowledge? Can we say there is 
knowledge of values, not in the trivial sense in which one can describe some 
people’s axiology, but intending to admit value judgments as production of 
knowledge? Austin does not tackle these issues.  But in the Austinian perspective 
we are elaborating, I think we can go so far as to say that there should be room for 
knowledge of values, insofar as not only verdictives about facts, but also 
verdictives about value can be correct or incorrect. What it is for a value 
judgment to be correct, however, need not be defined in the same way as what is 
for a statement of fact to be true.  
 
 
6. Philosophical implications for social ontology 
 
Be it as it may with values, Austin’s view of illocution appears to support realism 
as to deontic states, since those deontic states that illocutionary acts are designed 
to bring about must be real ones if the act is to be an action at all. Indeed, without 
an effect, there would be no action. This view, once again, highlights action, and 
namely, the active production of deontic states by social agents. As we have seen 
(in sections 2 and 3), the key to such production is intersubjective agreement. 
While a stone may be there even if nobody realizes it is there, a state of right or 
obligation cannot exist unless there is some kind of agreement about its being the 
case. On certain occasions, this agreement may be cognitive and conscious, but it 
need not always be. It is enough for it to be implicit, for example, in the 
coordination of the lines of conduct of the relevant agents. For example, if a 
command is complied with without protest or hesitation, it is safe to assume that 
the state of obligation stemming from it has been agreed upon (indeed, it has been 
acted upon). If, in complying with a command, an agent protests against being 
obliged to perform that action, this too reveals the basic acceptance of the 
speaker’s authority and the binding force of her illocutionary act. Lack of worry 
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about one’s non-compliance may indicate a failure to take the received command 
seriously or perhaps the refusal to take it as a command at all. Nonverbal, by-
default agreement suffices for the deontic state to be brought about and become a 
component of the situational context of the current interaction, from which it 
might even be inherited by other contexts, thus becoming a largely trans-
contextual feature of the interpersonal relation among the agents involved. 
It should be noted that the production of deontic states follows both a 
forward-looking and a backward-looking direction. Looking forward, the output 
of an illocutionary act is a deontic state, which comes into existence thanks to the 
illocutionary act (as part of its performance). Looking backward, the 
accomplished illocutionary act and its outcome presuppose the satisfaction of 
certain conditions about the agent’s status before the performance. If the agent 
did not have the presupposed status, but the illocutionary act is accepted as such, 
her status is somehow reassessed and redefined.  
This is one of the phenomena that Lewis (1979) dubbed “accommodation” 
and has perhaps not been studied in sufficient depth with respect to illocutionary 
acts, where it displays paradoxical features. The rise of a leadership (which did not 
exist at all before the first command of the new leader was recognized as such and 
obeyed) may be an example of “accommodation”; it is certainly an example of the 
influence of presuppositions on social relations. The feeling is that it is from the 
recognition of that command on, and because of the presuppositions of 
commanding, that the agent starts enjoying authority over his or her addressee. 
The status of the agent is changed from that moment on, thanks to the 
presuppositions or felicity conditions of his/her act, which should have been true 
before that act. 
Many social realities can be described as sets of deontic states of the agents 
involved: property, marriage, a contract of employment, can all be almost 
completely specified by listing the rights, obligations, and other deontic states 
that are assigned to their participants. Even complex institutions can be described 
in terms of what it is that those who participate in them can do or have to do, or 
can expect others to do, or must not do, and the like. Roles (in a family, in a peer 
group, or professional ones) often involve a weaker deontic state, that is, the kind 
of duty that corresponds to other agents’ legitimate expectations. 
Deontic states such as having a right or an obligation are represented in 
language as the possession on the part of an agent of  “the right to...” or “the 
obligation to...”: we speak of rights, obligations, duties, licenses, etc., as of objects 
of a particular kind, which we may call “deontic objects”. Here, I make no 
attempt to discuss whether this way of speaking is literal enough to amount to a 
shared assumption that rights, obligations, duties, licenses and the like exist as a 
peculiar category of objects. Laws, for example, are most certainly thought of as 
something that really exists: perhaps, as existing normative, and therefore 
deontic, objects. So, one may want to consider deontic states as consisting of the 
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attribution of a deontic object to an agent. It is to be noted that the ability to 
bring about deontic states (therefore creating deontic objects, if you like) is the 
basis of our capacity for creating shared environments through language and is 
therefore central to culture and civilisation.  
 
 
7. A puzzle and its proposed solution 
 
I conclude by indicating a limitation from which this fascinating perspective 
suffers. Are deontic states (and objects) steady and permanent enough, as one 
would expect of the building blocks of our social and cultural reality, or are they 
constantly liable to cancellation because there might be infelicities in the 
illocutionary procedures producing them or the speaker might fail to secure 
uptake? Certainly, these states and objects appear in the perspective illustrated as 
being dependent upon human interaction (as well as framing it). It would seem 
that they cannot come into being, or survive, without the support of 
intersubjective agreement. Thus, Austin’s notion of illocution might be deemed 
inadequate for providing social ontology with secure foundations, or at the very 
least, it is not enough if what we are searching for are agent-independent objects. 
It is to be noted that deontic objects may even be observer-independent, but are 
not, and cannot be, agent-independent.  
Let us recall, though, what we have said above about the Austinian 
perspective on value judgments. Verdictives produce legitimate claims to 
knowledge (which, by default, can be taken as knowledge) if they are grounded in 
the agent-speaker’s recognized competence, but a perfectly felicitous verdictive 
may still be wrong. If it is a judgment about facts, it will be either true or false. 
And as to value judgments, Austin seems to admit of some objective 
correctness/incorrectnes for them too.  
Now consider an issue of human rights. Imagine a social group in which a 
child is believed and dealt with as not endowed with any right. The way she is 
spoken to and about never comprises any right-granting illocution: she is never 
addressed with permissions, concessions, promises, apologies or wishes; moreover, 
no matter what she says (imagine she speaks, nevetheless), she is never taken as 
performing verdictives, exercitives, or commissives. Has she, then, no right? If by-
default intersubjective agreement around her is that she is to be dealt with that 
way, can this be accepted as a reason to say that so-called human rights do not 
hold in her case? Of course not. Indeed, the notion of human rights is designed to 
apply precisely to such cases and to help protect people in such conditions. It can 
apply, I surmise, because judgments about justice are verdictives and therefore 
liable to be correct or incorrect. A judgment to the effect that the way those 
people deal with that child conforms to justice, would be clearly incorrect 
(whatever they may believe about their own behaviour and their reasons). We 
The Austinian conception of illocution and its implications for value judgments and social ontology 
 
630 
 
may conclude that in fact, the child does have human rights, or perhaps, more 
precisely, that human rights should be attributed to her. The former way of 
putting it assumes that her rights are already there, albeit unrecognized. The 
latter way amounts to claiming that she has a right to human rights. I would 
prefer the latter way of putting it, as it matches better not only our intuitions 
about justice, but also the perspective on rights as deontic objects developed 
above. It is we, in fact, who both recognize the child’s right to human rights and 
issue a verdictive about her deontic state that is both felicitous and (hopefully) 
correct.  
The moral is that illocutionary uptake can be accepted and theorized as the 
basic source of deontic states and objects, without falling into a counterintuitive 
(if not dangerous) sort of relativism, providing that the correctness/incorrectness 
of verdictives is not reduced to a mere matter of intersubjective agreement. This is 
one reasons for having not just one level of assessment of speech acts, but two: in 
Austin’s terms, this means a felicity/infelicity assessment and an assessment 
aiming at detecting (objective) correctness/incorrectness. Defeasibility is limited 
to cases of infelicity, while error and injustice are the targets of our continuous 
efforts to redress and improve our relations with the world we live in as well as 
with each other.  
 
 
References 
 
Austin, John L. 1962. How to Do Things with Words. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 2nd 
revised edition 1975. 
Bach, Kent, and Robert M. Harnish. 1979. Linguistic Communication and Speech Acts. 
Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 
Grice, H. Paul. 1957. “Meaning”. The Philosophical Review 64:377–388. Repr. in: H. Paul Grice, 
Studies in the Way of Words, pp. 213–223 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1989). 
Hare, Richard M. 1952. The Language of Morals, Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Hart, Herbert L. A. 1949. “The ascription of responsibility and rights”. Proceedings of the 
Aristotelian Society 49:171–194.   
Kissine, Michail. 2013.  “Speech act classifications”. In: M. Sbisà and K.P. Turner (eds.), 
Pragmatics of Speech Actions, 173-201. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton. 
Lewis.  David. 1979. “Scorekeeping in a Language Game”. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8: 
339–359. 
Millikan, Ruth G. 1998. “Proper function and convention in speech acts”. In: Lewis Edwin 
Kahn (ed.), 
The Philosophy of P. F. Strawson, 25-43. Chicago, Ill.: Open Court. 
Millikan, Ruth G. 2005. Language: A Biological Model. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Sbisà, Marina. 1984. “On illocutionary types”. Journal of Pragmatics 8: 93–112. 
Sbisà, Marina.  2006. “Communicating citizenship in verbal interaction: principles of a speech 
act oriented discourse analysis”. In: Heiko Hausendorf, Alfons Bora (eds.), Analysing 
Citizenship Talk, 151–180. Amsterdam: John Benjamins. 
Sbisà, Marina. 2007. “How to read Austin”. Pragmatics 17: 461-473. 
MARINA SBISÀ 
 
631 
 
Sbisà, Marina. 2009. “Uptake and conventionality in illocution”. Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 5: 
33–52. 
Sbisà, Marina. 2013. “Locution, illocution, perlocution. In: M. Sbisà and K.P. Turner (eds.), 
Pragmatics of Speech Actions. Berlin: De Gruyter Mouton. 25-75.  
Searle. John R. “What is a speech act?” In: Maurice Black (ed.), Philosophy in America. 
London: Allen and Unwin, 1965, pp. 221—239 
Searle, John R.  1969. Speech Acts: An Essay in the Philosophy of Language. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Searle, John R. 1995. The Construction of Social Reality. New York: The Free Press. 
Stevenson, Charles L. 1944. Ethics and Language. New Haven: Yale University Press. 
Strawson, Peter F. 1964. “Intention and convention in speech acts”. Philosophical Review 73: 439–460.  
Repr. in: K.T. Fann (ed.), Symposium on Austin, 380–400. London: Routledge. 
Witek, Maciej. (Forthcoming.) “An interactional account of illocutionary practice”. Language Sciences 
47: 43-55. 
 
